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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Derrick Lawrence Hughes appeals from the summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Hughes, at the time age 56, repeatedly raped 16 year old P.M. by 
penetrating her mouth and anus with his penis. (#30823 PSI, pp. 1-5, 16.1) He 
had in his possession photographs and video of the sexual abuse and of the 
victim posed naked and engaged in sexual conduct. (#30823 PSI, pp. 2, 5.) He 
ultimately pied guilty to five counts of rape, two counts of sexual battery of a 
minor, disseminating of harmful material, and two counts of possession of 
sexually exploitative materials. (#30823 PSI, p. 1; R., pp. 84-91, 93.) Twelve 
additional counts, including counts of possession of sexually exploitative 
materials and sexual battery of a minor child, were dismissed. (#30823 PSI, pp. 
5, 16; R., pp. 84-91, 93.) 
In preparation for sentencing, Hughes underwent a Sex Offender Risk 
Assessment and Evaluation. (Attached to #30823 PSI ("hereinafter 
"Evaluation").) As part of that evaluation Hughes also underwent a polygraph 
examination. (Attached to #30823 PSI.) 
1 The district court in this case took judicial notice of the PSI, the psychosexual 
evaluation and the sentencing transcript in the underlying criminal case. (R., p. 
151.) That case bears Supreme Court docket number 30823. The state is, 
contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, moving that the Court take judicial 
notice of the PSI and psychosexual evaluation from docket 30823, which are not 
currently in the appellate record. 
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At the sentencing hearing counsel for Hughes moved for a second 
psychosexual evaluation. (R., pp. 95-96.) The district court denied the motion. 
(R., p. 96.) 
At the sentencing the prosecutor characterized the evidence against 
Hughes from the sentencing exhibits, PSI, letters before the court, and grand jury 
transcript. (R., pp. 97-100.) The prosecutor pointed out that military record 
indicated Hughes was discharged for sexually abusing his stepdaughter. (R., p. 
98 (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 11-20).) He started a sexual relationship with another girl when 
she was 17 and he was 41, took pornographic pictures of her while she was still 
a minor, and ultimately married her. (R., p. 98 (Tr., p. 14, L. 21 - p. 15, L. 3).) 
Hughes and his then wife took in a 16-year-old juvenile, and Hughes took 
pornographic pictures of her, which were found on his computer. (R., p. 98 (Tr., 
p. 15, Ls. 11-18).) Also found on Hughes' computer were pornographic pictures 
he had taken of a 15-year-old girl he had befriended doing sexual acts. (R., p. 98 
(Tr., p. 15, L. 19 - p. 16, L. 3.) Hughes would also go to the mall and take 
pictures of teenage girls. (R., p. 98 (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 4-16).) 
The prosecutor also laid out in some detail the extent to which Hughes 
had gone to select a vulnerable girl, groom her, and, while abusing her try to 
prevent her from revealing the abuse. (R., pp. 98-99 (Tr., p. 16, L. 17 - p. 19, L. 
3).) She explained that Hughes had destroyed a lot of evidence, but that the 
police were still able to recover "hundreds and hundreds" of pornographic 
pictures, and that the state had put before the court, in the form of exhibits, the 
photographs the state was able to ascertain Hughes himself took of teenage 
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girls. (R., p. 99 (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 12-22).) After his arrest Hughes sent many letters 
to a friend in an attempt to get the friend to help him manipulate the victim into 
recanting. (R., p. 99 (Tr., p. 19, L. 23- p. 21, L. 2).) The friend, however, turned 
the letters over to law enforcement, and also wrote a letter himself indicating how 
Hughes had no desire to stop molesting teenage girls. (R., p. 99 (Tr., p. 20, L. 5 
-p. 21, L. 21).) 
The prosecutor mentions the psychosexual evaluation once, asserting that 
it shows Hughes is not amenable to outpatient treatment. (R., p. 99 (Tr., p. 21, 
Ls. 21-22).) 
In its comments at sentencing the district court mentioned the Evaluation 
twice: Once to note that the diagnosis of adult antisocial personality disorder 
called into question whether Hughes' expressions of remorse were sincere 
statements of remorse for the harm he had caused (R., p. 104 (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 10-
20)), and the second time to point out that the Evaluation was "the single best 
piece of information in [Hughes'] favor" at sentencing, because it indicated a 
moderate risk of re-offense (R., p. 105 (Tr., p. 43, L. 18 - p. 44, L. 1 )). 
The district court imposed sentences of life with twenty years determinate 
on the rape and sexual battery counts, all to run concurrently; one year in jail for 
the dissemination of harmful material, to run consecutively; and five years 
determinate on both counts of possession of sexually exploitative materials, 
consecutive to the other sentences; for a total aggregate sentence of 25 years to 
life. (R., p. 106 (Tr., p. 46, L. 14- p. 47, L. 16).) 
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Hughes filed a post conviction petition timely from the affirmation of the 
judgment on appeal. (R., pp. 7-37, 49-51.) In addition to claims concerning his 
guilty plea, he asserted: (1) "Petitioner did not have counsel present during 
pretrial pollygraph [sic]"; (2) "Counsel did not insure that defendant had an 
independent psychiatrist"; (3) "Counsel was not present during psychological 
evaluation which was a violation of the petitioner's right to [sic] self incrimination, 
or make sure defendant had his Miranda [sic] rights read to him prior to the 
evaluation"; and (4) "Counsel did not make sure defendant had his Miranda [sic] 
rights read to him prior to his PSI investigation." (R., pp. 8-9; see also, R., pp. 
19-21, 27, 33,) 
The state moved for summary dismissal of the petition. (R., pp. 55-108.2) 
After a hearing at which counsel for both parties presented argument (see 
generally Tr.), the district court granted the state's motion and summarily 
dismissed the petition (R., pp. 133-56). Hughes filed a timely notice of appeal 
from the summary dismissal of his petition. (R., pp. 157-60.) 
2 The brief in support of the motion for summary dismissal indicates a motion for 
summary dismissal was filed (R., p. 55), as does the register of actions (R., p. 1 ). 
The actual motion does not appear in the appellate record. 
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ISSUES 
Due to its length and the number of issues stated (Appellant's brief, p. 7), 
Hughes' statement of the issues is not reproduced here. The state submits that 
the issues before this Court are: 
1. Has Hughes failed to show that he was entitled to the presence of counsel 
during his psychosexual evaluation? 
2. Has Hughes failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claims 
that depend on the theory that the psychosexual evaluation and polygraph 
examination were "custodial interrogations" requiring a Miranda rights instruction 
and waiver and which should have been terminated once he allegedly invoked 
the right to the presence of counsel? 
3. The district court denied Hughes' claim that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request a psychosexual evaluation by an independent evaluator on the 
basis that the record showed such a motion was in fact made, and therefore 
should have been addressed on direct appeal. Hughes argues the merits of this 
claim without challenging (or even acknowledging) the district court's factual 
findings and legal determination that this claim was procedurally barred. Should 
this Court decline to consider Hughes' improperly raised appellate issue? 
4. Has Hughes failed to show that he alleged a cognizable claim of prejudice 
arising from counsel's alleged failure to advise Hughes that he could invoke his 
right to silence and not participate in the psychosexual evaluation? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Hughes Has Failed To Show That He Was Entitled To The Presence Of Counsel 
During His Psychosexual Evaluation 
A. Introduction 
The district court analyzed Hughes' claims that his counsel was not 
present for the psychosexual evaluation under the general rubric of Estrada v. 
State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), and concluded that Hughes had 
failed to establish a prima facie claim of prejudice. (R, pp. 148-54.) On appeal, 
Hughes argues that the court erred in applying the prejudice standard of Estrada, 
either because the prejudice standard of Estrada does not apply to the claim or 
because a viable claim of prejudice was established in the record. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 8-26.) The state agrees that it was error to apply the prejudice prong of 
Estrada to Hughes' claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because 
counsel was not present during the psychosexual evaluation, but only because it 
was error to apply any of the analysis of Estrada to that claim. On the contrary, 
because Hughes was not entitled to the presence of counsel at the psychosexual 
evaluation, he failed to state any cognizable claim for post conviction relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
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1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
C. Hughes Has Failed To Show He Had A Right To The Presence Of 
Counsel At The Psychosexual Evaluation 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to 
counsel during all "critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him. 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2007) (citing United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 
P.2d 415 (1981)). "If the stage is not critical, there can be no constitutional 
violation no matter how deficient counsel's performance." Estrada, 143 Idaho at 
562, 149 P.3d at 837 (citing United States v. Benlian, 63 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 
1995) (brackets and quotation marks omitted)). Although a defendant has the 
right to advice from counsel on his rights and whether to take a psychological 
examination, that right has not been deemed to include any right to the presence 
of counsel. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562-63, 149 P.3d at 837-38 ('This Court's 
finding that a Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel in the critical stage 
of a psychosexual evaluation inquiring to a defendant's future dangerousness, 
does not necessarily require the presence of counsel during the exam." 
(emphasis in original)). 
Hughes has cited to no decision by any court that has determined a 
criminal defendant has the right to have counsel present for a pre-sentencing 
psychosexual evaluation. Hughes instead first claims that the Court in Estrada 
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"implicitly held" that the right to counsel includes the right to the presence of 
counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13.) The Court specifically said, however, that 
its "finding that a Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel in the critical 
stage of a psychosexual evaluation inquiring to a defendant's future 
dangerousness, does not necessarily require the presence of counsel during the 
exam." Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562-63, 149 P.3d at 837-38. Hughes' argument 
that the Court in Estrada implicitly held what it explicitly stated it was not holding 
is disingenuous. 
Hughes next relies on two cases where a right to the presence of counsel 
in a pre-sentence interview was found, In re Carter, 848 A.2d 281 (Vt. 2004), and 
State, ex rel. Russell v. Jones, 647 P.2d 904, 906 (Or. 1982).3 (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 14-15.) These two opinions, however, stand in stark contrast with numerous 
courts that have held the opposite. See, !M1, State v. Kauk, 691 N.W.2d 606 
(S.D. 2005) (rejecting right of counsel found in Jones as contrary to authority and 
citing cases); see also United States v. Benlian, 63 F.3d 824, 827-28 (9th Cir. 
1995) ("[T]he presentence interview is not a critical stage of the adversary 
proceedings, whether viewed in the context of pre- or post-Guideline law"); 
United States v. Washington, 11 F.3d 1510, 1517 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he 
presentence interview is not a critical stage of the proceeding within the meaning 
of the Sixth Amendment"), cert. denied, 828 511 U.S. 1020 (1994); United States 
v. Bounds, 985 F.2d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e have previously rejected this 
3 Because two justices concurred only in only part of the opinion, the court found 
the right to presence of counsel only under the Oregon Constitution; only one 
justice found the right under the Sixth Amendment. Jones, 647 P.2d at 908-09. 
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argument, reasoning that no right to counsel attaches at a presentence interview, 
as the interview is not a critical stage of the proceedings"); United States v. 
Tisdale, 952 F.2d 934, 940 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[l]n non-capital cases such as this 
one the presentence interview does not represent a critical stage of the 
prosecution" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Johnson, 935 
F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1991) ("We hold that an ex parte presentence conference 
between a court and a probation officer is not a critical stage of the sentencing 
proceedings."); United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 844-45 (7th Cir. 1989) 
("We conclude that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel did not 
extend to [defendant]'s presentence interview by the federal probation officer."); 
Musgrove v. State, 638 So.2d 1347, 1352 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) ("Because the 
probation officer did not constitute a government prosecutor and because the 
appellants' right to counsel does not extend to the presentence interview, there 
was no error in the trial court's consideration of the presentence investigative 
report."); State v. Pete, 857 So.2d 1107, 1110 (La. Ct. App., 4th Cir., 2003) 
("Clearly the defendant did not have a right to counsel during the presentencing 
interview."); People v. Daniels, 386 N.W.2d 609, 609-13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) 
("[W]e do not believe that the preparation of the presentence report in this case 
was a critical stage of the proceedings to which defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attached."); State v. Barber, 494 N.W.2d 497, 501-02 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1993) ("We find [federal cases rejecting PSI as a critical stage] persuasive 
and conclude Barber's Sixth Amendment challenge is without merit."); People v. 
Cortijo, 291 A.D.2d 352, 739 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (2002) ("[A] presentence interview 
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does not constitute a stage of the proceedings at which the right to counsel 
attaches"); Commonwealth v. Burton, 301 A.2d 675, 676-77 (Pa. 1973) 
(concluding that no Sixth Amendment right attaches because "the presentence 
interview is not an undertaking by the police to elicit incriminating statements, but 
rather it is designed to help the sentencing judge impose a fair and just 
sentence."); State v. Knapp, 330 N.W.2d 242, 243-45 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) 
("recogniz[ing] that having an attorney present would contribute little and might 
seriously disrupt the [PSI] examination" and concluding that no right of counsel 
"applies to the conducting of a presentence interview"). 
In Estrada, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a defendant has the right to 
obtain accurate advice from counsel about his right to invoke his right to silence 
and decline participation in a psychosexual evaluation. Hughes has cited to no 
court that has concluded the right to counsel includes the right to the presence of 
counsel for purposes of a sentencing psychosexual evaluation (as opposed to a 
PSI interview). Courts have, however, rejected a right to the presence of counsel 
at a psychological evaluation in differing contexts. United States v. Trapnell, 495 
F.2d 22, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1974) ("there is no right to counsel at a psychiatric 
examination" because such an examination is not "the kind of critical stage in the 
proceedings at which the assistance of counsel was needed or at which counsel 
could make a useful contribution" and "the presence of counsel could very well 
destroy the effectiveness of the interview" (quotation marks and citations 
omitted)); United States v. Bondurant, 689 F.2d 1246, 1249 (5th Cir. 1982) ("a 
defendant does not have a constitutional right to have an attorney present at the 
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psychiatric examination since to do so might well defeat the purpose of the 
examination and since the examination is not the kind of critical stage at which 
assistance of counsel is needed or is even useful"); United States v. Byers, 740 
F.2d 1104, 1115-22 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant had right to counsel 
regarding decision to waive right to silence by asserting insanity defense but, 
once waived, did not have right to presence of counsel at evaluation by state's 
psychiatric expert); In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 893 P.2d 60, 64-65 (Az. 
App, Div. 1, 1994) (upholding order barring defense counsel from presence at 
psychological evaluation of juvenile conducted by state's expert in relation to 
"battered child syndrome" defense) (citing State v. Schackart, 858 P.2d 639, 646-
47 (Az. 1993)); People v. Mahaffey, 651 N.E.2d 1055, 1064 (Ill. 1995) (no right to 
presence of counsel for examination by state psychiatrists on issue of fitness to 
stand trial); Cain v. Abramson, 220 S.W.3d 276, 279-80 (Ky. 2007) (no right to 
presence of counsel in evaluation by state officials ordered after insanity defense 
raised); Thorson v. State, 895 So.2d 85, 123-24 (Miss. 2005) ("there is no 
constitutional right for counsel to be present during a mental evaluation"); 
Commonwealth v. Banks, 943 A.2d 230, 236-39 (Pa. 2007) (no right to presence 
of defense counsel for evaluation by state psychiatrist when issue of competency 
to be executed was raised); State v. Hardy, 325 S.E.2d 320, 322 (S.C. 1985) (no 
right to presence of counsel for pre-trial psychological examination); State v. 
Martin, 950 S.W.2d 20, 25-28 (Tenn. 1997) (court agreed "with the courts which 
have distinguished the 'critical stage' prior to a psychiatric examination from the 
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examination itself" and concluded Sixth Amendment does not "require the 
presence of counsel during a court-ordered mental examination"). 
Hughes has failed to show error in the denial of his claim that his Sixth 
Amendment rights were violated because counsel was not present for the 
evaluation. Requiring the presence of counsel at such evaluations would 
"'contribute little and might seriously disrupt the examination."' Estelle v. Smith, 
451 U.S. 454, 470 n.14 (1981) (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 602 F.2d 694, 708 (5th 
Cir. 1979)). "Psychiatric exams are not depositions." Banks, 943 A.2d at 238. 
"[T]here are valid diagnostic reasons for refusing to permit counsel to be present 
during a psychiatric exam." Mahaffey, 651 N.E.2d at 1064. Although the 
decision whether to submit to an evaluation may be a critical stage requiring the 
advice of counsel, the evaluation itself is not. Byers, 7 40 F .2d at 1115-22; 
Martin, 950 S.W.2d at 25-27. The district court therefore properly dismissed 
Hughes' claim that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
because counsel was not physically present during the psychosexual evaluation. 
D. Hughes Has Failed To Show He Was Entitled To The Presence Of 
Counsel For The Pre-Sentence Investigation Interview 
Hughes also argues that he had a right to have his counsel present during 
his interview as part of the pre-sentence investigation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 41-
77.) Idaho follows the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have 
determined that there is no right to the presence of counsel during a routine pre-
sentence investigation. Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P.2d 506 (2007). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that controlling precedent will not 
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be overruled "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be 
unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate the plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. Humpherys, 
134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)). See also, State v. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660,680 (1992) ("[P]rior decisions of 
this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong or have proven over 
time to be unjust or unwise."). Hughes has failed to show that the holding of 
Stuart and the almost unanimous determinations by other courts that there is no 
constitutional right to the presence of counsel for the pre-sentence interview is 
manifestly wrong, unjust or unwise, or contrary to obvious principles of law. 
11. 
Hughes Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claims 
That Depend On The Theory That The Psychosexual Evaluation And Polygraph 
Examination Were "Custodial Interrogations" 
A. Introduction 
Hughes argues on appeal that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
move to suppress the results of the psychosexual evaluation and the PSI. 
Specifically, he argues the pre-sentence interview and psychosexual evaluation 
were "custodial interrogations," and therefore he was entitled to suppression 
because the evaluator did not inform him of his Miranda rights and did not cease 
the interrogation once he asked for counsel. (Appellant brief, pp. 27-41, 77-78.) 
Because the district court correctly concluded that such a motion would not have 
succeeded, and therefore counsel's performance was not deficient and Hughes 
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suffered no prejudice, Hughes has failed to show error in the summary dismissal 
of these claims. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,807,839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
C. Hughes Has Failed To Show Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Not 
Seeking Suppression Of The PSI Or Psychosexual Evaluation 
1. Hughes Has Failed To Show That His Counsel Was Deficient For 
Failing To Make A Motion That Would Have Necessarily Failed 
Under Existing Law 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant is 
required to show that counsel's performance was deficient and that he was 
prejudiced by that deficiency. LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 
427, 430 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984)). To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's 
representation was within the "wide range of professionally competent 
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assistance." Id. at 690; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 
1176 (1988). A claim of deficient performance "requires a showing that counsel 
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
"Because of the distorting effects of hindsight in reconstructing the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong presumption 
that counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance -- that is, 'sound trial strategy."' Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 
775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90); 
Aragon, 114 Idaho at 760, 760 P .2d at 1176. Strategic or tactical decisions 
made by trial counsel will not be second-guessed on review, unless those 
decisions are made upon a basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. State v. 
Roles, 122 Idaho 138,145,832 P.2d 311,318 (Ct. App. 1992); Davis, 116 Idaho 
at 406, 775 P.2d at 1248. 
T~is standard for effectiveness of counsel does not require a lawyer to 
pursue novel theories. See State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 308, 986 P.2d 
323, 341 (1999); see also Hughes v. State, 598 S.E.2d 43, 46 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2004 ). "While the failure to advance an established legal theory may result in 
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the failure to advance a novel 
theory never will." Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 448 (Ky. 2001). 
"There is no general duty on the part of defense counsel to anticipate changes in 
the law." Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 670 (3rd Cir. 1996) (quoting 
15 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3rd Cir. 1989)); 
accord United States v. Ardley, 273 F.3d 991, 993 (11th Cir. 2001 ); Lott v. Coyle, 
261 F.3d 594,609 (6th Cir. 2001); Fann v. Bowersox, 247 F.3d 841,843 (8th Cir. 
2001 ). 
At the time of sentencing in Hughes' underlying criminal case,4 it was well-
established in Idaho law that a defendant in a criminal case was not entitled to 
Miranda warnings before a routine pre-sentence investigation or psychosexual 
evaluation. State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 759, 810 P.2d 680, 697 (1991) 
(overruled on other grounds, State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991) 
(no violation of Fifth Amendment to consider PSI prepared in prior proceeding at 
which no Miranda rights were provided); State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 44 
P.3d 1193 (Ct. App. 2002) (no right to Miranda warnings for psychosexual 
evaluation because it is akin to routine pre-sentence investigations). Hughes has 
failed to show that his attorney performed deficiently by failing to raise a novel 
theory of law that would have required the reversal of existing law. 
2. Miranda Rights Did Not Apply To The PSI Interview Or The 
Psychosexual Evaluation 
Even if the theory were not novel, Hughes has failed to show ineffective 
assistance of counsel because even today he would not have the right to 
Miranda warnings or to have non-law enforcement personnel respect a request 
for counsel. 
4 The pre-sentence investigation report was prepared on March 2, 2004. (#30823 
PSI, p. 1.) 
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Law enforcement agents must warn a suspect subject to a custodial 
interrogation of his rights to counsel and to silence and obtain waivers of those 
rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("custodial interrogation" 
triggering the need for warnings is "questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody" (emphasis added)). This 
rule applies, however, only when the interrogation is in a "police dominated 
atmosphere." Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) (citing Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 445). Corollary to this rule, law enforcement officers must stop 
interrogation if either of these rights is invoked. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477, 484-485 (1981) (invocation of rights bars further "police-initiated" 
interrogation). 
Hughes contends that Miranda warnings are required whenever a "state 
actor" asks questions of a suspect or defendant in custody. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 35-36.) In Perkins, the Supreme Court of the United States expressly 
rejected a similar "argument that Miranda warnings are required whenever a 
suspect is in custody in a technical sense and converses with someone who 
happens to be a government agent." Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297. "It is the premise 
of Miranda that the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and 
official interrogation." kL. "Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires 
that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the 
concerns that powered the decision are implicated." kL. at 296 (quoting Berkemer 
v. McCarty. 468 U.S. 420,437 (1984)). 
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A "police dominated atmosphere" is lacking in a psychosexual evaluation 
or a pre-sentence investigation, where there is little fear that the interplay of 
"custody and official interrogation" will result in "coercion" to waive the rights to 
counsel or silence. Pre-sentence investigators and psychiatrists do not employ 
the same interrogation techniques as police officers, nor do they have the same 
motivations. To hold them to the same legal standard as officers, in providing 
warnings, obtaining waivers, and ceasing their interviews, is not consistent with 
the underlying rational of Miranda. 
The cases states that police officers must provide and obtain a waiver of 
Miranda rights. Likewise, when there is an invocation of rights police officers 
must stop interrogation. Neither the express holdings of these cases nor their 
underlying rationales apply to interviews conducted by persons who are not 
police officers and who are not gathering evidence with which to bring or pursue 
criminal charges. Hughes has failed to show that counsel was deficient for not 
bringing a suppression motion and that he was prejudiced by the lack of such a 
motion, and has therefore failed to show error in the summary dismissal of this 
post-conviction claim. 
111. 
Hughes' Claim That The District Court Erred By Dismissing His Claim That 
Counsel Ineffectively Failed To Request A Psychosexual Evaluation By An 
Evaluator Of The Defense Choice Is Was Disproved By The Record 
The district court dismissed Hughes' claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel for allegedly failing to move for a psychosexual evaluation performed by 
an expert of the defense's choosing because counsel had in fact made such a 
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motion, which the court had denied. (R., pp. 142-43.) Because counsel had 
made such a motion, any error was an error of the court that should have been 
raised on direct appeal and was therefore barred by LC.§ 19-4901(b) (barring 
claims that could have been raised on direct appeal). (R., p. 143.) 
Hughes argues that because ineffective assistance of counsel is not a 
claim that can be raised on appeal, the district court erred in dismissing this 
claim. (Appellant's brief, pp. 70-80.) This argument miscomprehends the district 
court's ruling. The flaw in Hughes' claim was factual; he claimed his attorney 
was ineffective because he did not request a defense evaluation, but the record 
of the underlying case clearly showed that counsel did in fact make such a 
request. A court may grant summary dismissal where post-conviction allegations 
are affirmatively disproved by the record. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 
531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975); Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 333-34, 971 P.2d 
1151, 1157-58 (Ct. App. 1998). Here the district court dismissed because the 
factual predicate of Hughes' ineffective assistance of counsel claim was 
disproved. (R., pp. 142-43.) Hughes' argument that a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel can not be made to an appellate court is irrelevant to the 
district court's dismissal for lack of a factual foundation. 
Hughes next argues that State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 
(1998), stands for the proposition that his trial counsel had a duty to "first obtain a 
confidential evaluation to determine what, if any, information should be released 
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to the court and the State." (Appellant's brief, pp. 80-82.5) This argument is 
without merit because Wood stands for no such proposition. 
Wood was c'harged for a horrific murder and was facing the death penalty. 
Before trial his counsel moved for, and the court ordered, a psychiatric 
examination to assist in the defense. Wood, 132 Idaho at 93, 967 P.2d at 707. 
Wood later told his counsel that he wished to plead guilty, but wished to complete 
the psychological evaluation before he did so, to see if it might provide a 
defense. Id. Prior to completion of the evaluation, however, Wood changed his 
mind and pied guilty. kt. The district court ordered that the report from the 
psychological evaluation originally ordered to assist the defense and not yet 
completed be included in the PSI, and defense counsel did not object. Id. The 
evaluator initially hired to assist the defense ultimately testified for the state at the 
sentencing hearing in support of aggravation. Id. at 93-94, 967 P.2d at 707-08. 
The Court thereafter imposed the death penalty. kt. 
The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately concluded that defense counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to having the defense psychiatric expert provide 
her report for sentencing without knowing what would be in the report. kt. at 97, 
967 P.2d at 711. The basis for this conclusion was that counsel's actions 
deprived Wood of any opportunity to assert his right to silence and unilaterally 
waived the confidentiality privilege against disclosure, ultimately allowing 
5 This appears to be an issue raised for the first time on appeal. As such it 
should not be addressed. State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 
(1992); State v. Garcia, 102 Idaho 378,387,630 P.2d 665,674 (1981). 
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admission of excludable evidence that led to the finding of a statutory aggravator 
making Wood eligible for the death penalty. lg_, at 100-01, 967 P.2d at 714-15. 
The holding and reasoning of Wood in no way support Hughes' argument 
that an attorney is ineffective for allowing his client to submit to a court-ordered 
evaluation without the opportunity to review the result and possibly prevent its 
consideration by the court. In Wood it was ineffective assistance of counsel to 
submit sight unseen a report that was inadmissible, and that ultimately made 
Wood eligible for the death penalty. This does not mean that it is ineffective 
assistance of counsel to ever allow his client to submit to a court-ordered (as 
opposed to defense controlled) sentencing evaluation. 
Hughes does not dispute the district court's conclusion that the underlying 
record affirmatively disproves his allegation that counsel did not request an 
additional examination by an expert of the defense's choosing. Likewise, his 
claim that it is always ineffective assistance of counsel to allow a defendant to 
submit to a court-ordered evaluation is unsupported by the law. Hughes has 
therefore failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of this claim. 
IV. 
Hughes Has Failed To Show That He Alleged A Cognizable Claim Of Prejudice 
Arising From Counsel's Alleged Failure To Advise Hughes That He Could Invoke 
His Right To Silence And Not Participate In The Psychosexual Evaluation 
A. Introduction 
The district court held that Hughes had not alleged a valid prima facie 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Hughes had alleged a prima facie 
claim of deficient performance by counsel (for failing to advise Hughes he could 
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invoke his right against compelled self-incrimination and refuse to take the 
psychosexual evaluation), but he had failed to show a prima facie claim that such 
deficient performance had prejudiced Hughes. (R., pp. 148-54.) Hughes argues 
that the district court erred and that he was prejudiced by the very fact that he 
underwent the evaluation and because the evaluation resulted in "prejudicial 
information." (Appellant's brief, p. 91 (incorporating by reference pp. 17-26).) 
Hughes' argument is without merit for two reasons: first, he never claimed he 
would not have taken the evaluation had he known of his right to refuse and, 
second, because, as found by the district court, Hughes' claims of prejudice are 
disproved by the record. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,807,839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco. Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
C. Hughes Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Finding That He 
Failed To Allege Facts Showing Prejudice 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984), the United 
States Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test, which a defendant must satisfy 
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in order to be entitled to relief; namely, deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice. See also Richman v. State, 138 Idaho 190, 192, 59 P.3d 995,997 (Ct. 
App. 2002) ("To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 
defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient, and that the 
defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency." (citations omitted)). To establish 
prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 565, 149 P.3d 833, 840 (2007) (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 
1174, 1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. 
App. 1999); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 
1994). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not 
make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 
Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. 
Hughes does not state a valid prima facie claim of prejudice because he 
does not assert that he would have invoked his right to silence and not taken an 
evaluation. In fact his affidavit repeatedly says that what he actually wanted was 
another evaluation by a mental health expert retained by the defense. (R., pp. 
20-23.) Because there is no allegation that Hughes would have actually decided 
to exercise his right to silence, he has failed to show prejudice arising from 
counsel's alleged failure to inform him of his right to silence. 
The claims of prejudice actually made also fail because they are directly 
contrary to the record. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 
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(1975) (claims disproved by underlying record may be summarily dismissed); 
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 333-34, 971 P.2d 1151, 1157-58 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(same). 
Hughes alleged he was prejudiced as follows: The polygraph was "used 
at sentencing to assist the state[']s case." (R., p. 15.) The polygraph "was also 
used to predict future dangerousness, at sentencing, to enhance the sentence 
imposed." (R., p. 18.) 'The prosecutor related [sic] to this polygraph at 
sentencing. 'It seems to me, Mr. Hughes you've been operating under the radar.' 
Referring to an incident that occurred thirty five years ago." (R., p. 19.) "But for 
the petitioner the evaluation was used for future dangerousness as an 
indispensable element of the aggravating circumstances which were the basis of 
the imposition of sentence." (R., p. 20.) Thus, all of the allegations of prejudice 
are that the evaluation was used to support a finding of future dangerousness. 
The record, however, shows that the district court did not make any 
determination of future dangerousness based on the psychosexual evaluation. 
On the contrary, the record shows that the sentencing court considered the 
evaluation "the single best piece of information in [Hughes'] favor" at sentencing, 
because it indicated a moderate risk of re-offense. (R., p. 105 (Tr., p. 43, L. 18 -
p. 44, L. 1 ).) 
On appeal Hughes argues that the evaluation was prejudicial in a number 
of ways, but fails to address a single allegation that he made to the district court. 
He has therefore failed to show that the allegations he actually made in the 
petition and supporting affidavit demonstrated a prima facie claim of prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
summary dismissal of Hughes' petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 20th day of January 2009. 
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